Approved For Release 2005/000 F. CIA-RDP79T00429A000300030029-3

As dictated by DC1 24 Jan 63 + given to Bundy Ifor President this day,

Suggested Statements on Soviet Presence in Cuba

On the basis of the attached paper, it may be concluded that substantial quantities of Soviet military equipment were delivered to the Cubans prior to July 1, 1962, including such items as nearly 300 tanks, some 200,000 small arms, an estimated 2,300 field artillery pieces ranging from 57 to 152 milimeter, about 650 anti-aircraft artillery pieces, 50 or 60 subsonic MIG aircraft and a variety of other items.

About 500 Soviet and Bloc technicians and training personnel were in Cuba to train the Cubans in the proper operation and the maintenance of this equipment.

Since July 1, substantial additional quantities of this equipment have been delivered, and furthermore, certain items such as the 24 ground-to-air installatimns with their inventory of missiles, the 4 coastal defense missile systems, the 12 KOMAR missile-carrying coastal defense boats and self-propelled mobile field pieces, including short-range ground missiles similar to our Honest John have been delivered to Cuba. Therefore the totality of Soviet equipment in Cuba has been substantially increased since July 1 and many items non-existent in Cuba prior to that time are now there in quantity.

We know that most of the recently delivered equipment, including the surface-to-air missiles and their attendant radar and communication system and the most advanced field equipment, are in the hands of an estimated 17,000 Soviet military personnel now in Cuba.

All offensive weapons, including MRBMs and IRBMs and bomber aircraft capable of reaching the United States that we know of, have been removed from Cuba and our aerial surveillance has not given us evidence that any such equipment remains. In the absence of penetrating on-site inspection,

SECRET

it is impossible to absolutely prove the non-existence of such equipment in Cuba but the estimate that all has been removed is considered acceptable.

25X1

Except for the withdrawal of the 42 MEMS and IRBE, and the 42 IL 28 aircraft and a modest quantity of ground equipment, we have observed no withdrawal of military equipment from Cuba, or no concentration of such equipment at leading points which might indicate a plan for such withdrawal.

SECRET

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

